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Abstract. A number of security models have been proposed for RFID
systems. Recent studies show that current models tend to be limited in
the number of properties they capture. Consequently, models are com-
monly unable to distinguish between protocols with regard to finer pri-
vacy properties. This paper proposes a privacy model that introduces
previously unavailable expressions of privacy. Based on the well-studied
notion of indistinguishability, the model also strives to be simpler, easier
to use, and more intuitive compared to previous models.
1 Introduction
RFID tags are small microchips with an antenna attached, usually embedded
within a plastic or paper package. Tags communicate wirelessly when interro-
gated by an RFID reader. The readers are much larger computing devices which
are normally networked to a back-end database. RFID tags are starting to be
commonly used for supply-chain and inventory applications to replace the ex-
isting barcode systems. Other applications of RFID tags include traffic transit,
building and vehicle access, payment cards and national passports.
The last ten years have witnessed an explosion of interest in the area of radio
frequency identification (RFID) security. The combination of mobility, wireless
communications and low-power hardware presents unique security challenges in
the design of authentication protocols, particularly with respect to ensuring pri-
vacy. Informally, in the context of RFID systems, privacy means that only autho-
rised parties (tag readers) are able to identify and track RFID tags. Many RFID
security models have been proposed in the past[2, 5, 17, 8, 10, 11, 12, 16, 18],
however there is no commonly agreed “good” privacy model for analysing RFID
protocols. As shown in the recent surveys of Chunhua et al . [6] and Coisel and
Martin [7], existing privacy models have significant limitations in terms of the
classes of protocols that can be analysed within the models and the strength
of the privacy notions considered, particularly in relation to the corruption of
tags. This paper proposes a new privacy model for RFID that overcomes the
limitations of existing models. The new model is simple enough so that it can
be widely adopted for security analysis by protocol designers.
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Stateful and Stateless Protocols. Proposed RFID protocols can be sep-
arated into two categories, stateless and stateful, depending on secret data man-
agement mechanism employed by the protocol. Stateful protocols are protocols
which make use of updatable information stored in the tag, referred to as the
state, whereas stateless protocols do not make use of any updatable state [1]. A
state typically consists of secrets that are used for tag authentication and are
updated when protocol sessions are completed successfully. Traditionally, state-
ful protocols have been considered to be more efficient but less private compared
to their stateless counterparts, this is mainly due to the ability to rely on state
updates for privacy features rather than solely on the encryption schemes im-
plemented within the tag. However, stateful protocols can attain certain privacy
notions that are otherwise unachievable. Naturally, their strengths and weakness
should be reflected in a privacy model.
An example of the different properties between the two types of protocols is
the vulnerability of stateful protocols to desynchronisation. Desynchronisation
commonly occurs when the last message of the protocol is not received, blocked
by an adversary for example, resulting in the internal state of one of the par-
ties not being updated. Next time the tag and reader engage in a protocol run,
either the protocol fails because of the non-matching states, or an additional
resynchronisation stage is executed. Both cases are likely observable by a third
party; therefore de-synchronisation may be seen as resulting in side-channel in-
formation leakage, which can be used by an attacker to trace the tag. A security
model for stateful protocols must take into account desynchronisation. This vul-
nerability does not affect stateless protocols. The model presented in this paper
introduces a new definition of stateful privacy, a notion that coexists with a
stateless notion of privacy.
Reader Corruption. Existing security models for RFID authentication model
readers and the back-end database as a single entity and assume that the reader
and backend database are implemented securely, so that the adversaries can-
not interfere with them. This assumption is based on the availability of greater
resources for their protection. Typically the back-end database is at least a
workstation-class system, which is hosted in a central physically secured lo-
cation. As discussed by Avoine et al. [4], assuming that the back-end database
cannot be directly attacked is unwarranted in practice. After all, these are servers
that are commonly connected to the Internet, where vulnerabilities and hacking
attacks are commonplace. In the new model presented here, readers and the
back-end database are also treated as a single entity, refered to as reader, but
adversaries are afforded with corruption powers that expose the secrets in the
back-end database. It must be noted that while Avoine et al.[4] discussed the
importance of reader corruption, they do not consider it within a formal security
model. Interestingly, it turns out that stateful protocols are naturally suited to
resist attacks involving corruption of the reader.
Side-Channel Leakage. Traditionally, side-channel information refers to phys-
ically observable characteristics of a system, such as power consumption and
heat, which can be used by an attacker to compromise security. Unfortunately
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most side-channel sources are independent of the underlying protocol and are
difficult to include in a security model. The new model focuses on side-channel in-
formation which is dependent on protocols and is easily observed without sophis-
ticated means. One notable example is the result of a protocol session, where the
results of a protocol can be observed though physical means, e.g. a door opening.
There has been other recent work showing that execution time can leak infor-
mation [3, 9]. As it is likely that more aspects of side channel will be discovered
in the future, it would be impractical to capture each distinct leakage scenario
independently. The proposed model does not focus on any specific trait, but
rather the main cause of side-channel information leakage: de-synchronization.
Contribution This paper proposes a new privacy model for RFID systems.
Although the model is designed for passive RFID systems, it is capable of ana-
lyzing active systems. Thus it can be used for protocols that are initiated by the
tag, and it does not limit the number of message rounds.
– The first distinct contribution of the model is the consideration of stateful
protocols. While previous work typically considered stateless protocols to be
stronger than stateful protocols, our results suggest that neither is always
stronger than the other. Thus both types of protocols have their merits.
– The second contribution is the introduction of reader corruption. In addition
to allowing reader corruption, the model distinguishes between corruption
of tag volatile and non-volatile memory, achieving previously unobtainable
notions of privacy. This separation reflects the more sophisticated skills re-
quired to extract information from volatile memory than from non-volatile
sources. Furthermore, two flavours of privacy, weak and strong, are defined,
based on the ability of the adversary to corrupt challenge tags, which creates
more meaningful expressions of privacy.
– Lastly, the paper presents a stateful protocol based on the stateless public-
key protocol of Vaudenay [18] highlighting the uniqueness of the stateful
definitions.
2 Model components
2.1 RFID System
The setup of an RFID system is simulated using the following two setup algo-
rithms:
– (rpk, rsk) ← SetupReader(rpd)
On input of a security parameter rpd, outputs public/secret key pair rpk,
rsk. In cases where public-key pairs are not utilized, rpk can be considered
as an empty string (φ).
– (tpk, tsk, K, S) ← SetupTag(T, rpk)
On input of identifier T and the reader’s public key rpk, a secret K, and a
public and private key pair (tpk, tsk) are generated. State S is initialized
according to the protocol specification. K is a fixed long term secret, whereas
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S is an updatable secret. It is common for protocols to make use of only one
of K or S; unused values are considered to be empty (φ). The values generated
are stored by the reader and/or tag according to the protocol specification.
Definition 1 (Session). A session is an instance of a protocol execution at a
party. Each party stores a session identifier pi for every initiated session which
is unique within the party. When two session ids piR and piT refer to the same
protocol execution, they are referred to as corresponding sessions. Each session
also holds a Result value indicating if a session has completed or has failed.
Definition 2 (Active Session). Sessions are labeled as either active or inactive.
It is only possible for a tag to have one active session at any point in time.
Volatile memory is assumed to be erased when a session is labeled inactive un-
less otherwise specified by the protocol.1 It is possible for readers to have multiple
active concurrent sessions with different tags.
2.2 Adversarial Oracles
As usual, the interaction between an adversary A and a RFID system is modelled
by oracles that the adversary is allowed to query:
– (piT , piR, t)← Execute(T )
This oracle models the situation where an adversary is eavesdropping on
the communication between the reader and tag T . A receives the protocol
execution transcript t with the corresponding session identifiers piT and piR.
A completed acknowledgement will be stored as Result if the protocol run
was successful, otherwise failed will be stored.
– (piR, piT )/(φ, piT )/(piR, φ) ← Initiate(T,R/T/R)
A initiates a protocol session with either with both tag T and reader R,
or only T or R, returning the new corresponding session identifiers piR and
piT or only session identifiers piT or piR. Any previous sessions of T or R,
and corresponding sessions are marked as inactive. If Result of the previous
session is not labeled, it will be labeled as failed. Unlike the Execute oracle,
this oracle allows the adversary to create an incomplete an session between
a reader and/or a specific tag.
– completed/failed/φ ← Result(pi),
A retrieves the value of Result of protocol session pi. If there is yet to be a
value of Result, φ is returned.
– r/φ ← SendTag(piT ,T, m)
Sends message m to session piT of tag T. A is returned a response message
r or φ as per protocol specification. In normal protocol interactions a re-
sponse message r would be returned, however there is also the possibility of
a ‘null’ response φ if the message sent was invalid, or the session had already
completed or failed. This oracle models the ability of the adversary to send
messages to RFID tags.
1 Corrupt Memory will return M= φ
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– r/φ ← SendReader(piR, m)
Sends message m to session piR of the reader R. A is returned a response
message r or φ as per protocol specification. Similar to the SendTag oracle,
in normal protocol interactions a response message r would be returned,
however there is also the possibility of a ‘null’ response φ if the message
sent was invalid, or the session had already completed or failed. This oracle
models the adversary transmitting a message to the RFID reader.
– (K, S ) ← CorruptTag(T ),
A obtains the long term secret K and session state S of T. Note that we as-
sume that tags will continue to function after corruption. This oracle models
the adversary’s ability to extract secret data from a tag through specialized
methods such as physical extraction.
– M ← CorruptMemory(piT , T )
The adversary is given the memory state M of tag T. M is the contents of
the temporary(V olatile) memory of T used when computing the output of
SendTag(piT , T ). For example, this can include input and output of values
of hash functions and any generated/received nonce depending on protocol
specification.
– Y /N ← Sync(T )
This query invokes a protocol-specific function F that determines if T and
R are in sync. This oracle models side-channel leakage of information due
to de-synchronized states. This oracle is aimed at stateful protocols where
it is possible for the updatable states to be out-of-sync. Stateless protocols
always return Y.
– db ← CorruptReader()
A obtains all information, including secrets, stored by R. This oracle mod-
els the ability for an adversary to obtain a snapshot of the database by
compromising the back-end system.
2.3 Adversary Classes
We consider the following classes of adversaries, depending on the oracle queries
they have access to:
Passive adversaries can only eavesdrop on communications between parties
and are not able to communicate with the tag or reader. Thus they are
allowed access to the Execute oracle, but not to the Initiate, SendTag and
SendReader oracles.
Active adversaries can not only access the tag but also the reader. Thus they
can access all four oracles Execute, Initiate, SendTag and SendReader.
Destructive adversaries are not allowed to interact with tag T after call-
ing CorruptTag(T ). This class of adversaries is similar to the destructive
adversary defined in [18].
Wide adversaries are not allowed to access the oracle Result to determine
whether a protocol session was successful or not. A wide adversary corre-
sponds to a real life attacker who may be unable to interact with protocol
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parties to observe the outcome of the protocol (e.g. whether a door opens).
Adversaries are assumed to be wide unless otherwise specified.
Narrow adversaries are allowed to access the oracle Result to determine
whether a protocol session was successful or not, representing attackers which
are close by the tag and the reader it interacts with.
Corrupt 1 (C1) adversaries are those who have access to the oracles CorruptTag
and Sync. They represent adversaries knowledgeable in the area of RFID
technology in particular the internal workings of an RFID tag.
Corrupt 2 (C2) adversaries are those who have access to oracles CorruptMemory
and CorruptReader. They represent adversaries with different skill-sets than
Corrupt 1 where specific knowledge of RFID might not be required but are
capable of compromising different aspects of the system.
Note that not all types of adversaries are exclusive of each other. Thus, for
example, we consider adversaries that are passive and C1, passive and C2, and so
on. A noteworthy distinctionwith respect to previous models is that corruption
powers are considered to be independent powers that can be possessed by any
adversary type rather than abilities of strictly more powerful adversaries. A
summary of the types of adversaries is given in table 1.
Passive Active Corrupt 1 Corrupt 2 Narrow Wide Destructive
Execute Execute CorruptTag CorruptMemory No Result Result No interaction with T
Initiate Sync CorruptReader after CorruptTag(T )
SendTag
SendReader
Table 1: Adversary classes
2.4 Privacy definitions
Privacy notions are defined based on two games played between the adversary
A and a challenger C. The first game applies to stateless protocols, whereas the
second one applies to stateful ones.
Stateless Game:
Phase 1
– Tags, T1, T2, . . . , Tn and reader R are simulated by C.
– A interacts with C via oracle queries.
– A selects two tags Ti, Tj .
– C selects c ∈{0,1}
– Ti and Tj are reassigned as Ta and Tb respectively if c = 0, else Ti and Tj
are reassigned as Tb and Ta.
Phase 2
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– A interacts with C though all oracles except for Sync, CorruptTag, and
CorruptMemory on Ta and Tb.
– A stops interacting with C and outputs c′.
– A wins if c′ = c.
Stateful Game:
In the Stateful privacy game, an extra oracle, BlindExecute, is introduced and
used by C at the start of Phase 2.
– BlindExecute(T )
A protocol session is executed between tag T and reader R with no output.
This oracle models situations where a tag communicates with the reader
in the absence of an adversary. The execution of the oracle is the same as
Execute only with no output.
In schemes where either or both parties store a previous secret for re-synch-
ronization purposes, BlindExecute might be required to be called more than
once for a scheme to remain private. However this additional requirement
reduces the privacy provided by the scheme.
Phase 1 Same as in stateless game.
Phase 2
– BlindExecute(Ta), BlindExecute(Tb).
– A interacts with C through all oracles.
– A stops interacting with C and outputs c′.
– A wins if c′ = c.
Definition 3 (Strong/Weak Game). A game is said to be Strong if during
Phase 1 the oracles CorruptTag(Ti/Tj) and/or CorruptMemory(Ti/Tj) has been
called, for either one or both of the challenge tags, Ti, A non-Strong game is
otherwise a Weak game.
Since the Strong game requires the use of corruption oracles, the notion is
not applicable for Active and Passive adversaries. Because Strong privacy implies
Weak privacy, it is assumed that a game is Strong unless otherwise specified.
Definition 4 (Privacy). A scheme is said to be A-G Private, if for any adver-
sary of class A ∈ {Wide, Narrow} × {Passive, Active, Destructive} × {φ,C1, C2, C1+
C2} playing privacy game G ∈ {Weak, Strong} × {Stateless, Stateful} have a
winning probability of 12 + , where  (the advantage) is negligible.
3 Comparison and Results
3.1 Comparison with Previous Models
A survey of proposed RFID models was recently conducted by Coisel et al. [7]
who discussed the advantages and disadvantages of current models before select-
ing five protocols to be compared. The survey discussed features which should be
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considered useful in future models. Most notable is the ability for an adversary to
choose and corrupt challenge tags, the differentiation between Narrow and Wide
adversaries, the ability for the adversary to play with all tags in the system, and
the ability for the model to analyze all protocols. The model presented in this
paper not only considers all the said abilities in addition to a novel notion of
privacy, but does so without compromising flexibility.
Of particular concern was the conclusion of Coisel et al. [7] that none of
the models was able to distinctively identify the privacy differences between the
protocols. The difference between tree-based and SK-protocols was shown to be
the most difficult to distinguish. Thus this section uses the same five protocols
as a baseline for comparison with other models and shows that the proposed
model can distinguish between all five. However due to space constraints, not all
full proofs will not be shown. A summary of the results can be found in table 2.
Protocol Results
SK-Protocol Weak Active+C1 Stateless
OSK Protocol Weak Active+C1 Stateful(Weak Passive+C1 Stateful)
O-FRAP Passive+C1+C2 Stateful Private
Tree-Based Active Stateless
PK-Based Active+C1 Stateless
Table 2: Comparison of Models
SK-Based Protocol This well-known protocol begins with the reader gener-
ating a random nonce NR. The tag, after receiving NR, generates its own nonce
NT and uses a pseudorandom function to generate the message H(K‖NR‖NT ),
where K is a unique secret of the tag. The reader than has to compute the same
message for all secrets stored until a match is found, completing the protocol.
Theorem 1. The SK-based protocol shown in Figure 4a is Weak Active+C1
Stateless Private.
Proof (Sketch):
By simulating the pseudorandom function H a random oracle ensures that it
is infeasible for an adversary to obtain K from H(K‖NR‖NT ). Given that K
is randomly distributed, and that the key space |K| is sufficiently large, the
advantage of the adversary is: Pr|A Adv| = 1|K|−# of CorruptTag calls .
OSK Protocol The OSK protocol makes use of two second pseudorandom
functions, H and G. Every time the tag receives a random nonce NR from the
reader, the secret state S is updated with G. For each authentication attempt,
the reader has to compute H(Gi(S′), NR) for every tag in the system.
Theorem 2. The OSK protocol[14] shown in table 3a is Weak Active+C1 State-
ful Private if the number of consecutive failed sessions at Ta/Tb < δ, otherwise
the scheme is Weak Passive+C1 Stateful Private.
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Reader Tag
S’ S
NR ∈R {0, 1}α
NR−→ NT ∈R {0, 1}α
mT = H(S‖NR)
S = G(S)
mT←−
Find H(S‖NR)= H(Gi(S′), NR), i < δ
S=Gi(S)
(a) OSK Protocol
Reader Tag
(ID−1, K−1, S−1), (ID, K, S) ID, K, S
NR ∈R {0, 1}α
NR−→
v = F (K,NR, S)
v = v1‖v2‖v3‖v4
S,v2←−
Computes v′3 S = v1
v′3−→
If v′3=v3, K = v4
(b) O-FRAP Protocol
Table 3: OSK, and O-FRAP Protocol
Proof (Sketch):
Assuming that secrets S are chosen uniformly at random, the scheme can achieve
Weak Privacy. Using a similar setup to the proof for SK-based protocol, there
would be an additional random oracle G. Evidently the scheme would not be
Strong private, since by obtaining S at any point in time will allow the adversary
to obtain all subsequent updates of S though G. However, the reverse is not true.
As it is possible to desynchronize the protocol beyond re-synchronization if the
number of consecutive failed sessions at a tag is less than δ, by bounding the
number of failed sessions it is possible for the scheme to be Weak Active+C1
Stateful Private. Without this bound the scheme would otherwise be Weak Pas-
sive+C1 Stateful Private.
O-FRAP The Optimistic Forward-secure RFID entity Authentication Protocol
(O-FRAP), shown in table 3b, was proposed by Le et al. in [17], and can be
referred to for a more detail description on the computation of v′3. In general,
the reader using NR (ID, K, S), or previous values (ID
−1, K−1, S−1), re-computes
v allowing it to check the values of v3. A pseudorandom function F is used in the
protocol, where the output v from input K,NR, S is separated into four sections
v1, v2, v3 and v4.
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Reader Tag
K K
NR ∈R {0, 1}α
NR−→ NT ∈R {0, 1}α
H(K‖NR‖NT ),NT←−
(a) SK Protocol
Reader Tag
rsk, K, IDT rpk, K, IDT
NR ∈R {0, 1}α
NR−→
mT = ENCrpk(NR‖IDT ‖K)
mT←−
(b) Public Key Protocol
Table 4: SK and Public Key Protocol
Theorem 3. The O-FRAP protocol shown in table 3b is Passive+C1+C2 State-
ful Private.
Proof (Sketch):
As it is possible to desynchronize the protocol with an active adversary[15], the
scheme cannot be Active-Stateful private. However, assuming a passive adversary,
even when the adversary has knowledge of (ID, K, S) and ID−1, K−1, S−1, it
is not possible to associate the secrets with the challenge tags after two calls of
BlindExecute. Thus the protocol is Passive+C1+C2 Stateful(2) Private.
Tree-based Protocol The tree-based protocol is proposed by Molar et al. [13]
and is very similar to the SK-based protocol shown in table 4a. Instead of each
tag sharing a single unique secret with the reader, however, each tag shares a
unique set of secrets. The secrets are also shared among tags, thus the corruption
of a tags can lead to compromise of uncorrupted tags.
Theorem 4. The tree-based protocol is Active Stateless Private
Proof (Sketch):
The proof is similar to that of the SK-protocol described in section 4a, only in
tree-based protocols the corruption of a large number non-challenge tags would
allow the adversary to win the Weak Active+C1 Stateless Private with non-
negligible advantage. Thus the protocol can only achieve Active Stateless Pri-
vacy. However, if given a bound on the number of times CorruptTag can be
called, Weak Active+C1 Stateless Privacy can be achieved.
Public Key Protocol The protocol shown in table 4b is presented by Vaudenay
in [18]. The protocol uses a public-key pair rsk and rpk.
Theorem 5. Scheme in Figure 4b is Active+C1 Stateless Private if (ENCrpk, DECrsk)
is IND-CCA2 secure.
Proof (Sketch):
The proof follows very similarly to that shown in Theorem 6. The only minor
difference is the omission of the PUF, thus the resulting adversarial advantages
will be the same.
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3.2 Other Results
Impossibility of Stateless Protocols to Achieve Strong-Stateful Pri-
vacy This section describes an attack within the any Strong-Stateful game that
allows the adversary to trivially win thus showing the impossibility for stateless
protocols to achieve any notions of Strong Stateful privacy. The adversary A
proceeds as follows:
– SetupReader(rpd)
– Tα ←SetupTag(Tα)
– Tβ ←SetupTag(Tβ)
– (Kα, Sα)← CorruptTag(Tα)
– Ta, Tb ← Tα, Tβ
– (Ka, Sa)← CorruptTag(Ta)
– if (Ka, Sa) = (Kα, Sα) b
′ = 0, else b′ = 1
– output b′
Evidently A wins with probability 1. The above attack assumes a C1 adversary,
however, a similar attack can be launched for a C2 adversary using CorruptReader.
Reader Tag
rsk, IDR, ID
−1
R rpk, ST
NR ∈R {0, 1}α
NR−→
NT ∈R {0, 1}α
S+1T ∈R {0, 1}β
IDT = PUF(ST )
ID+1T = PUF(S
+1
T )
mT = ENCrpk(NR‖IDT ‖ID+1T ‖NT )
mT←−
DECrsk(mT )→
if IDT = IDR, ID
−1
R = IDR
IDR = ID
+1
T
NT−→
if NT = NT , ST = S
+1
T
Fig. 1: Active+C1 Stateful Private Protocol
Stateful Public-Key Protocol The scheme shown in Figure 1 is a stateful
protocol using both public-key and a Physical Unclonable Function PUF. A PUF
is a hardware pseudorandom function which is unique to each tag, thus it is not
assumed to be public. After each successful protocol execution, the state S is
updated.
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Theorem 6. Scheme in Figure 1 is Active+C1 Stateful Private if (ENCrpk, DECrsk)
is CCA2 secure.
Proof:
The section will show that using an adversary that can win the Stateful Ac-
tive+C1 Game with non-negligible advantage, it is possible to construct an ad-
versary that can break CCA2. In the proof 2 games are played by 3 parties: the
challenger, C, CCA Adversary, ACCA and AGame, an adversary that can break
the Active+C1 Game with non-negligible advantage. A CCA2 game is played
between C and ACCA, and a Stateful Active+C1 Game is played between ACCA
and AGame.
To model the Physical Unclonable Function(PUF), a random oracle is simulated
by the challenger, only that A does not have direct access to this oracle.The PUF
is simulated by the challenger where on input a value si ∈R {0, 1}γ , generate and
returns a unique random value oi ∈R {0, 1}χ. Values si and oi are then stored
on a table. All values of s and o are to be unique within the table. On the event
that a previous sj is used as input, the previously assigned oj is returned. As
only C has access to PUF, there are no oracles that allow A to interact with the
PUF.
To begin the proof, SetupReader(rpd) is executed, followed by the exe-
cution of SetupTag(T) p unique times, where p ≥ 2. The public key of the
IND − CCA2 Game is used for the public key of the protocol(rpk). The simu-
lation of oracles by ACCA to AGame are as follows:
– Initiate(T ), ACCA generates values piR and piT . piR and piT are marked as
Active.Both values are stored and returned to AGame.
– Execute(T ), If T exists, ACCA generates values piR ,piT , and NR. Values
NR ∈R {0, 1}α, NT ∈R {0, 1}α and S+1T ∈R {0, 1}β are generated. ST and
ID+1T are passed to the PUF with outputs IDT and ID
+1
T respectively. The
message mT=(NR‖IDT ‖ID+1T ‖NT ) is encrypted using rpk. The correspond-
ing ST and S
+1
T are also retrieved. If IDR = IDT , then ID
−1
R is replaced
by IDR and IDR is replaced by ID
+1
R , if IDR = ID
−1
R then only IDR is
replaced by ID+1R . Result of piR and piT are marked as Y . (piR ,piT , [NR, mT ,
NT ]) are returned to A
CCA.
– Initiate(T ), ACCA generates values piR and piT . Both values are stored and
returned to AGame.
– SendTag(piT , T,NR), If piT exists and that it is Active, the corresponding
ST is retrieved, otherwise φ is returned. Values NT ∈R {0, 1}α and S+1T ∈R
{0, 1}β are generated. ST and ID+1T are passed to the PUF with outputs
IDT and ID
+1
T respectively. The message (NR‖IDT ‖ID+1T ‖NT ) is encrypted
using rpk and returned as mT .
– SendTag(piT , T,NT ), If piT exists and that it is Active, A
CCA the correspond-
ing ST and S
+1
T are retrieved, else φ is returned. If NT corresponds to the NT
used in piT , the value of ST is replaced by the value of S
+1
T . Y is recorded in
the Result and S+1T is then removed. N is otherwise recorded as the Result.
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– SendReader(piR,m), If piR exists the corresponding ST and S
+1
T are retrieved.
mT is forwarded to C for decryption, returning (NR‖IDR‖ID+1R ‖NT ). If
IDR = IDT , then ID
−1
R is replaced by IDR and IDR is replaced by ID
+1
R
before NT is returned. If IDR = ID
−1
R then only IDR is replaced by ID
+1
R
before NT is returned. If IDR 6= IDRorID−1R then φ is returned.
– CorruptTag(T ), values (K, S) and IDT corresponding to T is retuned. If T
does not exist, φ is retuned.
– Sync, ACCA retrieves and computes IDT before evaluating if IDT = IDR.
If IDT = IDR, Y is returned, else N is returned.
ACCA and AGame plays Phase 1 of the Stateful privacy game as specified. Even-
tually AGame select challenge tags Ti and Tj . A
CCA removes Ti and Ti from the
system and are reassigned as Ta and Tb
2. During phase 2, for one instance of
Execute(T[a/b]) or SendTag (T[a/b]), A
CCA picks challenge message with C where
m0 = NR‖IDTa‖K and m1 = NR‖IDTb‖K and returns the response from C to
AGame as described above. The remainder of the game is simulated by CCCA as
in Phase 1. At the end of the game AGame outputs b
′
Game, A
CCA selects b
′
CCA
= b
′
Game.
Adv|ACCA| = (Pr[AGamewin|b′Game = bCCA]
1
2
+Pr[AGamewin|b′Game 6= bCCA]
1
2
)− 1
2
Given the probability of AGame winning the Stateful Privacy game equals
1
2 + , where  is non-negligible. Thus for half the time when b
′
Game = bCCA,
Adv|ACAA| = Adv|AGame| = . However, the at other times where b′Game 6=
bCCA there would be an error in simulation. Thus three cases can be considered:
– C1: AGame gives maximum advantage: Pr[AGamewin|b′Game 6= bCCA] = 1,
Adv|ACCA| = 14 + 2
– C2: AGame gives minimum advantage: Pr[AGamewin|b′Game 6= bCCA] = 0,
Adv|ACCA| = 14 + 2
– C3: AGame gives random advantage: Pr[AGamewin|b′Game 6= bCCA] = 12 ,
Adv|ACCA| = 2
Thus, Adv|ACCA| ≥ 2 . This concludes the proof.
Theorem 7. Scheme in Figure 1 is also Destructive+C1+C2 Stateful Private
if (ENCrpk, DECrsk) is CCA2 secure.
Proof (Sketch):
The proof is very similar to the one shown above with the additional simulation
of the two oracles below:
2 For simplicity it is assumed that ACCA always picks 0. Thus bGame = 0
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– CorruptMemory (piT , T ), A
CCA checks if piT of T is Active. If piT is Active,
ACCA returns (IDT , NT , S
+1
T , ID
+1
T ,mT ).
– CorruptReader, The contents of the database is given to AGame. This would
include rsk, (IDR, ID
−1
R ) for all T .
As ID−1R is also stored in the database, BlindExecute would need to be
called twice for the protocol to be private. The remainder of the proof remains
identical to the one above.
4 Discussion, Conclusion and Future Work
Recently concerns were raised in the ability of current RFID models to capture
various privacy properties. It is suggested that current models do not offer suf-
ficient notions of privacy need to analyze the privacy differences in proposed
protocols. The model proposed in this paper not only aim to address the con-
cerns raised, but also novel notions of privacy not offered in current models. By
offering a new corruption model, the ability for reader corruption and a state-
ful notion of privacy, the model introduces both stronger and weaker notions
of privacy compared to current models. Extending on the analysis from Coisel
et al. [7] the model was able to distinguish the privacy properties of the five
protocols, which was not possible in the eight chosen models.
This paper also presents a stateful protocol based on Vaudenay’s public key
protocol capable of achieving the strong notion of Active+C1 Stateful and De-
structive+C1+C2 privacy. Due to space constraints, however, little has been
presented on notions of privacy involving reader corruption, and there has been
little discussion on the weaker notions of privacy. Also open is the problem of
achieving the strongest notions of privacy, namely Active+C1+C2 Stateless and
active+C1+C2 Stateful privacy. But as the Active+C1 notion of privacy is likely
to require public-key cryptography, such protocols are unlikely to be practical
for RFID. Nevertheless, the model is capable of analyzing said protocols when
the need arise. Finally, it would be of interest to further explore the privacy
implications between different levels of strong and weak privacy and between
stateful and stateless privacy.
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